Overreacting to Russia

In the Washington Post, Eugene Rumer makes a generally persuasive case in his piece Why "Contain" Russia?

Rumer's argument is that there is little need for the U.S. or Europe to back Russia into a corner because of some "neo-imperialistic" impulses on Russia's part. This is particularly so, since Russia has proved so ineffectual when it does attempt to influence its neighbors.

All of which brings this question to the fore: How does one contain a regime that is already dangerously weak at home and abroad and the alternative to which could be an even worse regime? Are we really prepared to pull the plug on cooperative threat reduction, on the NATO-Russia Council, on the Proliferation Security Initiative, on the six-party talks on North Korea, on NATO's Partnership for Peace, etc.?

Are we ready for the alternative: a series of robust military assistance programs to some of NATO's newest members and aspirants, a battle of ideas with Russia, a deliberate policy of isolating it in the international arena and actively discrediting its regime at home?

All more than fair enough. However, Rumer's care is weakened somewhat by his skirting the issue of the moment. Were the U.S. and European condemnations of the "elections" in Ukraine, in his view, wrongheaded? When it comes to our reactions to Russia's actions, where is the line to be drawn between justifiable criticism and unnecessary hectoring? In Rumer's vision that remains an unanswered (and unasked) question.